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When people change employers, 
they often take a pay cut. It should 
come as no surprise that most people 
would prefer not to reduce their wages 
when they change jobs, but sometimes 
they have no choice. If someone is ﬁ  red 
and forced to seek a new employer, for 
example, a wage decline might reﬂ  ect 
the worker’s poor performance and dis-
missal from the previous job. To the 
extent that potential new jobs require 
references from previous jobs, wages in 
the new job may be lower. 
But many of those switching to lower-
paying jobs appear to accept the lower 
wage voluntarily. One reason a person 
might do so is that the new job offers 
the possibility of higher wages in the 
future compared to the old job. Wages 
at the old ﬁ  rm may be close to the high-
est wage payable there, and the only 
way to achieve continued wage growth 
is to switch employers. This explana-
tion has been the dominant one in 
economics for some time, and it is 
still widely accepted (a recent study by 
Postel-Vinay and Robin is an example). 
This Economic Commentary advances 
another explanation: Job choice is 
based not just on wages, but also on the 
non-wage characteristics (or “ameni-
ties”) desired by the worker, such as the 
work environment or the job’s cachet. 
A wage decline may represent the fact 
that the amenities of the new job are 
greater for the worker than those of the 
old job. In this view, a decline in wages 
and the choice of new job character-
istics are part of an individual’s opti-
mal lifetime consumption proﬁ  le. This 
means that the individual, armed with 
knowledge of wages and amenities at 
various jobs, begins his or her working 
life by mapping out a career path that 
will generate the highest level of satis-
faction. Of course, everyone would pre-
fer to have a job with both high wages 
and high amenities. But since that com-
bination is not available at a every job, 
people do the next best thing—they 
choose high wage/low amenity jobs 
sometimes and low wage/high amenity 
jobs at others. 
Another way of looking at the fact that 
jobs are evaluated in terms of both 
wages and amenities is to say that 
wages and amenities trade off in set-
ting the value of the job to a worker, 
that is, wages are affected by job ame-
nities. That wages are affected by job 
amenities is referred to in economics as 
compensating differentials. The name 
refers to the idea that if lower wages 
are observed for some job, there will 
be some non-wage characteristic, such 
as better working conditions, that com-
pensates for the lower wage, thereby 
making the jobs equally attractive. 
The realization that compensating dif-
ferentials are a factor in job choices 
has important implications for assess-
ing whether people’s quality of life has 
improved over time. Wages are often 
used as a measure of an individual’s 
standard of living. But now we see 
why this might be misleading. For even 
though people move from a higher-
wage job to a lower-wage job, it does 
not mean they have been made worse 
off as a result. The fact that people 
make the change willingly implies that 
such moves make them better off.
A recent paper incorporates compen-
sating differentials into a dynamic set-
ting, in the sense that individuals may 
choose different jobs—with differ-
ent wage and non-wage characteris-
tics—over their lifetime (see Nosal 
and Rupert 2003). More speciﬁ  cally, 
in such a setting workers might move 
from high-paying to low-paying jobs to 
be able to consume a higher level of the 
non-wage component at some point in 
their lives. 
 Compensating Differentials
As you can see from the observa-
tions of the eighteenth-century writ-
ers quoted in the box on the next page, 
the idea that different job characteris-
tics command different prices is not a 
new one. Jobs that are more risky will 
pay more, other things equal, than safer 
jobs. Jobs in a clean and pleasant envi-
ronment will pay less than those in 
unpleasant surroundings. 
These examples indicate that the 
myriad job characteristics will each 
have a price. They also indicate that the 
wage or the level of the characteristic 
will adjust so as to attract the needed 
workers to ﬁ  ll the jobs. You can see 
why this must be the case by suppos-
ing for a moment that it is not. Suppose 
that some job paid a very high wage 
and had a high level of a characteristic 
Economists have long observed that 
wages alone do not fully reﬂ  ect a job’s 
value—job “amenities” also play a 
role. Recent empirical studies have 
conﬁ  rmed this observation to be the 
case. Researchers are also ﬁ  nding that 
workers frequently choose to take 
lower-paying jobs, which suggests 
that not only do workers care about 
the non-wage characteristics of a job, 
but also that they will change jobs 
throughout their lives to achieve the 
best mix of wages and amenities that is 
right (and obtainable) for them.valued by workers. Basic supply and 
demand analysis tells us that the supply 
of workers for that job would be high 
and wages would fall until the value of 
the jobs were equal. Note also that the 
wage might remain ﬁ  xed and the value 
of the characteristic decline, but either 
way, the value of that job to the worker 
would fall.
The theory of compensating differen-
tials is supported by empirical evidence 
from the labor market. In a recent 
paper, Dey and Flinn show that jobs 
that include employer-provided health 
care pay less than those that do not. 
In other words, workers “pay” for the 
health insurance in the form of lower 
wages. Altonji and Paxson show that 
jobs in which workers face hours con-
straints pay higher wages. Said differ-
ently, jobs with more ﬂ  exibility in work 
hours will pay lower wages. 
 Data on Wage and 
Employer Changes
The evidence that a substantial num   ber 
of individuals move from higher-
paying to lower-paying jobs and that 
many do so voluntarily may be surpris-
ing to some, but it is documented in the 
Nosal and Rupert study already men-
tioned. The researchers came to their 
conclusions after analyzing data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), a data set that began survey-
ing individuals in 1968 and continues 
to track those same individuals (and 
their offspring) over time. Along with 
demographic information, the PSID 
also asks questions concerning wages 
and changes in employers. Between 
1984 and 1992, questions were asked 
to capture detailed information about 
job changes that involved a move from 
one employer to another. First, respon-
dents were asked whether they had 
changed employers during the year. 
If the answer was yes, several follow-
up questions were asked. Respondents 
were asked the reason for the change, 
selecting an answer from among those 
provided. They were asked the month 
their previous job ended and the month 
their new job began. In addition, they 
were asked their wage rate when they 
left their old job and their starting wage 
at the new job. 
The ﬁ  rst thing the researchers learned 
from the PSID data was that a substan-
tial number of all job changes from 
one employer to another involved 
a reduction in wages—speciﬁ  cally, 
42.1 per  cent. Nearly half of the job 
switchers—49.5 percent—moved to a 
higher-paying job, while about 10 per-
cent received the same wage (see table 
1, which presents data for workers who 
changed employers for any reason). 
Table 2 shows the data for people who 
say they quit their previous job. That 
is, we can reasonably infer that these 
individuals left their previous employer 
voluntarily, as opposed to those who 
may have left involuntarily, for exam-
ple, if they were ﬁ  red or laid off. Here 
again, a substantial number—42.5 per-
cent—received lower wages with their 
new employer. 
Table 2 also gives some other interest-
ing statistics: the average age of movers 
as well as the length of time they spent 
without a job. The mean age of vol-
untary movers to lower wages is 32.7 
years, to higher wages 32.0, and for 
those moving to the same wage, 33.4. 
Each of these is slightly lower than for 
all changers combined, revealing that 
those who moved involuntarily are 
older than those who did so voluntarily. 
In terms of time between jobs, those 
moving to jobs with lower wages spent 
roughly one-half of a month longer 
in between jobs. There are, of course, 
many possible explanations for both the 
age and time differences. 
It may be the case that some of the 
observed wage changes are the result 
of misreporting or measurement error. 
It is certainly plausible that small wage 
gains might be reported as small wage 
declines, or vice versa. However, most 
of the wage declines reported in the 
survey seem too big to miss. Table 
3 provides some magnitudes of the 
change in wages. As the table indi-
cates, the 25th percentile corresponds 
to a wage decline of 7.5 percent, and 
the median decline is approximately 
18 percent. These numbers mean that 
roughly three-quarters of the volun-
tary changers had wage declines near 
10 percent, and half of them had wage 
declines of at least 18 percent. While 
plausible, it does not seem likely that 
the worker would not recognize such 
large declines. 
 Employer Changes and 
Job Amenities
Nosal and Rupert develop a model that 
can reproduce the observations pre-
sented in the preceding tables. Hav-
ing such models helps researchers 
to understand the behavior of people 
  he crafts which require the most time in training or most ingenuity 
  and industry must necessarily be the best paid. A skillful cabinet maker 
  must receive a higher price for his work than an ordinary carpenter, and 
a good watchmaker more than a farrier. The arts and crafts which are accom-
panied by risks and dangers like those of founders, mariners, silver miners, etc. 
ought to be paid in proportion to the risks. When over and above the dangers 
skill is needed they ought to be paid still more, e.g. pilots, divers, engineers, 
etc. When capacity and trustworthiness are needed the labour is paid still more 
highly, as in the case of jewellers, bookkeepers, cashiers and others.
 –––Richard Cantillon
Essay on the Nature of Commerce in General 
(published 1755, written around 1730)
  irst, the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness 
  or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness of the employ
  ment. Thus in most places, take the year round, a journeyman tailor 
earns less than a journeyman weaver. His work is much easier. A journeyman 
weaver earns less than a journeyman smith. His work is not always easier, but 
it is much cleanlier. A journeyman blacksmith, though an artiﬁ  cer, seldom earns 
so much in twelve hours as a collier, who is only a labourer, does in eight. His 
work is not quite so dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in daylight, and 
above ground. Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable pro-
fessions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally 
under-recompensed, as I shall endeavour to show by and by. Disgrace has the 
contrary effect. The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business; but it 
is in most places more proﬁ  table than the greater part of common trades. The 
most detestable of all employments, that of public executioner, is, in proportion 
to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade whatever.
–––Adam Smith
Wealth of Nations (1776)
T
FTABLE 2  VOLUNTARY JOB CHANGERS
SOURCE:  Ed Nosal, and Peter Rupert. 2003. “How Amenities Affect Job and Wage Choices 
over the Life Cycle,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 03-02.
TABLE 1  ALL JOB CHANGERS
and markets, in this case, workers and 
labor markets, for many reasons. One 
of the most important reasons is that a 
model provides a veriﬁ  able check on 
the explanations asserted (the model, 
which sets the explanations down in 
mathematical terms, has to be able to 
generate outcomes that are in keeping 
with observed behavior). The key to 
this particular model is that job ameni-
ties are incorporated explicitly into a 
dynamic model of job choice. Job ame-
nities are deﬁ  ned as various non-wage 
characteristics of a job, such as job 
stress, the general work environment, 
inﬂ  exible scheduling for hours or days 
of work, location of the employer, and 
so on. What is also important in get-
ting the model to account for observed 
behavior is that it assumes that these 
amenities are ﬁ  xed while an employee 
works for a particular employer. That 
is, to change the level of a job amenity, 
a worker must change employers. 
This assumption may not be too far-
fetched. One explanation as to why 
such amenities might be ﬁ  xed for a 
particular employer is that it is more 
efﬁ  cient to have one set of work rules. 
The task of managing a set of work-
ers may be much more difﬁ  cult if there 
are different rules for different workers. 
Additionally, there are many jobs for 
which it is necessary for the employees 
to work together as a team, for example 
on an assembly line. Obviously, the 
team will also be required to keep the 
same hourly work schedule.
A general idea of the way the model 
is constructed can be had by suppos-
ing there are just two jobs, Job 1 (with 
Employer 1) and Job 2 (with Employer 
2). Job 1 pays a higher wage than Job 2 
but has a lower level of some job ame-
nity. That is, Job 1 pays a high wage, 
but also demands longer and more 
stressful hours. There is also a general 
consumption good that the individual 
values that does not depend on the par-
ticular job chosen. 
Using this basic framework, Nosal and 
Rupert show that workers will always 
choose to change employers over their 
lifetime. Which job is initially cho-
sen, the high wage/low amenity or low 
wage/high amenity, will depend on the 
particular characteristics of the model. 
One feature of the model is respon-
sible in particular for generating the 







Percent of job changers 42.1 8.4 49.5
Age 33.6 34.5 32.6







Percent of job changers 42.4 4.8 52.8
Age 32.7 33.4 32.0
Months between jobs 1.32 0 0.92
Quantiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Lower wage –2.03 –7.46 –17.8 –40.5 –72.5
Higher wage 4.08 9.43 19.8 41.4 73.6
employee’s switch to a new employer. 
The model requires the amenity offered 
at the chosen job be consumed in its 
entirety while at the current job—it 
cannot be saved to consume at some 
later date. The fact that employees can-
not consume the high level of the ame-
nity while working for the high wage 
employer is what will generate the 
employer switch. 
As an example, suppose the amenity 
is a ﬂ  exible work schedule. Employer 
1 provides high income but little free 
time. Early in an individual’s career 
(before marriage and kids, for exam-
ple), workers may choose to work for 
Employer 1. There will be some level 
of income though at which a worker 
would be willing to trade some of the 
income for a little more free time—
especially when the worker marries 
and has children! However, the only 
way to do this in this model is to quit 
Employer 1 and take the lower pay-
ing job with more ﬂ  exible hours at 
Employer 2.
This outcome is akin to a standard 
result in economics: under some fairly 
general conditions, individuals prefer 
to smooth their consumption over their 
lifetime. For example, if you knew that 
a year from now you were going to get 
a raise that would double your income, 
you would prefer to borrow some 
money today to be able to consume 
more today as well as more tomor-
row. Even though you have to pay the 
debt back in the future—so you won’t 
be able to consume quite as much in 
the future as you could if you had no 
debts—you maximize your lifetime 
level of satisfaction. Being able to bor-
row against future income means you 
can “have the best of both worlds,” con-
suming more today and more tomorrow. 
In the world with ﬁ  xed amenity lev-
els across jobs, individuals would also 
prefer to have the best of worlds—high 
wages and high amenities. But this 
combination can be achieved only by 
switching employers. That is, to con-
sume that particular bundle of goods, 
an individual must work for some 
length of time for each employer. 
 It’s Not Always about the 
Money
The success of the dynamic model of 
job choice with compensating differen-
tials tells us that job amenities do ﬁ  g-
ure prominently when people decide 
where they want to work. An important 
implication of this ﬁ  nding is that using Peter Rupert is an economic advisor at 
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income alone to measure standards of 
living can be misleading. For example, 
if a person switches from a high pay-
ing, risky job to a lower paying but 
less risky job, the standard of living 
solely measured by income would fall. 
But the fact that the individual chose 
to move to the less risky job implies 
an improvement in overall well-being. 
Comparing standards of living across 
countries can also be misleading if job 
characteristics other than wages are 
left out of the calculation. The ratio of 
incomes between the United States and 
Chad, for example, is about 40 to 1, 
but the true difference in the standard 
of living between the two countries is 
likely to be greater. 
While the idea of compensating dif-
ferentials has been around a long time, 
incorporating it into formal models 
of job choice has yielded some new 
insights. Besides giving us a more 
accurate picture of workers’ decisions 
and labor market behavior, it has pro-
vided hints of ways we might better 
represent the standard of living. 
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